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CHALLENGING PROSECUTORIAL PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGES: LITTLE v. UNITED STATES
Suzanne Frare
L

INTRODUCrION

In Little v. United States,' the District of Columbia Court of Appeals was called
upon to decide an issue of discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. The court
held that the defense counsel failed to present a prima facie case of discriminatory
use of peremptory challenges under Batson v. Kentucky.2 The defense counsel
focused primarily on the number of black venire persons that the prosecutor struck
and the racial composition of the jury.3 In addition, the court held that the trial
judge's stated reasons for denying the defense counsel's claim under Batson was
incorrect as a matter of law." However, the court of appeals, by relying on the
record, did not find reversible error because the trial judge based his decision on
his own observations of the prosecutor's actions. 5
The court, in closing, "cautioned trial judges to make a clear record of their
reasons for finding or not finding a prima facie case"0 of discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges. The court suggested that trial judges make a clear record
7
of their reasons, pointing to facts which they relied on, to reach their decision.
When the prosecutor's actions are questionable, the judge should always inquire
about the prosecutor's reasons for making such strikes "since the burden on the
prosecutor in rebutting a prima facie case is not overly onerous nor timeconsuming."
IL THE CASE
In January 1990, a jury convicted Marvin C. Little of assault with intent to kill
while armed,9 carrying a pistol without a license,' 0 and one count of possession of a

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

613 A.2d 880 (D.C. 1992)
476 U.S. 79 (1986).
Little v. United States, 613 A.2d 880, 886.
Id. at 887.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 888.
Id. at 887-888.
D-C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-501. 3202 (1989 & 1991 Supp.).
DC. CODE ANN. § 22-3204(a) (1989 & 1991 Supp.).
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firearm during a crime of violence"1 .
The defense counsel made a timely move for a mistrial citing Batson v.
Kentucky."2 Defense counsel pointed out that his client, Mr. Little, is black, and
the prosecutor exercised six of his seven peremptory strikes against black
indiViduals, a number of whom answered no questions. The defense counsel asked
the court to require the prosecutor to give the court neutral explanations for his
strikes. The trial judge pointed out that the vast majority of people in the city are
black, therefore, the odds are heavy that when a prosecutor exercises peremptory
challenges it will be against a black person. The judge stated that he did not notice
anything that resembled racial motivation by the prosecutor in his exercise of
peremptory challenges. The judge then went on to say, "I believe one of his strikes
was someone who was white. I think that probably satisfies any constitutional
claim that could even be made in the wildest stretch of the imagination."1 " Then
the judge gave the prosecutor the opportunity to respond if he desired.
The prosecutor responded by stating, "I don't think I need to respond . . . if I
am put on the spot . . .I would have to give it some thought." The prosecutor

then proceeded to give general reasons such as he looked at the prospective juror's
"demeanor," "gait" and looked for jurors who would give the case a "fair shake."
14
The prosecutor noted he "wasn't keeping track" of his strikes.
The judge responded, "I think that explanation is certainly satisfactory to me
I don't want to do anything inadvertently that will leave a cloud over this
record. But, from my perspective, that is about as far-fetched a claim as could
possibly be made." 15
The prosecutor "passed" four times by opting not to strike anyone. Out of the
six venire persons he struck, only two answered questions on voir dire. The
questions they answered related to whether their close friends or relatives were in
law enforcement. The final jury composition was eight black members, four white
members and two black alternates.
The trial judge dismissed the defense counsel's motion and the court of appeals
affirmed this decision.

II. DC CODE ANN § 22-3204(b) (1989 or 1990 Supp.) The jury acquitted the appellant of assault
with a dangerous weapon and one of the possession of a firearm during a crime of violence.
12. Batson, at 79.
13. Little,
at 883.
14. Id. at 883.
15. Id.
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LEGAL BACKGROUND

Peremptory challenge is defined by Black's Law Dictionary as "The right to
challenge a juror without assigning, or being required to assign, a reason for the
challenge." 6 Peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that
permits "those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate." Avery v.
Georgia.17 It first came into use in the 1600's under English common law which
allowed criminal defendants to make these challenges."6 The right to use
peremptory challenges is not guaranteed under the United States Constitution, but
rather is a tool used in an attempt to obtain an impartial jury, which is a
guaranteed right under the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
Challenges to limit the power to exclude jurors have historically evolved in the
criminal context to combat the evils of racial discrimination. The first case to raise
the issue of improper exclusion of potential jurors was the 1880 case of Strauder v.
West Virginia.19 In Strauder the Supreme Court reversed a state murder
conviction because it was shown that black venire persons were purposely excluded
from serving on the defendant's grand and petit jury. A defendant has no
guaranteed right to have a jury composed of persons of his own race.20 However,
the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees that members of his race will not be purposely excluded on account of
race or on the false assumption that, as a group, they are not qualified to serve on
the jury."1 In Norris v. Alabama,'22 the Supreme Court held that merely denying
use of peremptory challenges for racial discriminatory reasons is insufficient to
on jury selection began in response to
rebut a prima facie case. Thus, "limitations
23
discrimination."
racial
of
problem
the
The first test the Supreme Court used to detect illicit use of peremptory
challenges was the equal protection standard in Swain v. Alabama."' Under the
Swain equal protection standard, the defendant must prove that the prosecutor
16. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1136 (6th ed. 1990).
17. Avery v. Georgia. 345 US. 559. 562 (1953).
18.

19.
20.
21.
allowed
22.
23.
(1989).
24.

Mark Curriden. The Death of the Peremptory Challenge. A.B.A J-. Jan 1994. at 62-

Strauder v. West Virginia. 100 US. 303 (1880).
ld.'at 305.
Id. at 306-307. The Supreme Court limited its holding to race or color. Group such as uomcn were
to be excluded from the jury. Id. at 310.
Norris v. Alabama. 294 US. 587 (1935).
Note, Due Process Limits on Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenges. 102 HAR'v L RE. 1013. 1014
Swain v. Alabama. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).

422

-

PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES

developed a systematic pattern of striking jurors for what appears to be for
improper reasons.2 5 This test proved to be virtually impossible to satisfy because it
implied researching a prosecutor's history of using peremptory strikes in other
cases.2 6 This led the California Supreme Court in People v. Wheeler2 7 to adopt a
more liberal Sixth Amendment test, and ultimately the United States Supreme
Court in Batson v. Kentucky 28 to adopt a more liberal equal protection test.
In People v. Wheeler two black defendants were convicted by an all white jury
of murdering a white man. The prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to strike
every black venire person from the jury. The trial judge refused to require the
prosecutor to explain his challenges and denied the defense counsel's repeated
motions for a mistrial. The California Supreme Court reversed the conviction
based on the cross-section (impartial jury) requirements of the Sixth Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 16, of the California Constitution.2 9
Both Constitutions have been interpreted to imply that the defendant has a
constitutional entitlement "to a petit jury that is as near an approximation of the
ideal cross-section of the community as the process of random draw permits.""0
The court recognized the importance of peremptory challenges and did not want
its holding to jeopardize the challenge, and thereby imposed limitations on
opportunities to raise objections.3 ' The most important limitation is the
requirement that the defense must establish a prima facie case of improper
exclusion before the court will scrutinize over the peremptory challenges. The
defense must prove that the excused jurors are members of a cognizable group and
that they are being excused solely because they belong to this group. 2
In Batson the U.S. Supreme Court reevaluated discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges, adopted a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection
standard and purposely avoided the Sixth Amendment cross-section analysis
applied by Wheeler. 3 The Batson analysis consists of a three step process: 1) the
challenging party must prove a prima facie case of discriminatory use of

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 223-224.
Batson v. Kentucky. 476 U.S. 79, 92 (1986).
People v. Wheeler. 583 P.2d 748 (1978).
Batson v. Kentucky. at -.
Wheeler. at 769.
Id.
Id. at 764.

32.

Id.

33.

Batson, at 137.
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peremptory challenge,a' 2) after a prima facie case has been proven the burden
shifts to the accused party who must give a "neutral explanation" for each

challenge,3 5 and 3) the trial judge must then "decide if the circumstances
concerning the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges creates a prima facie

case of discrimination against black jurors."3'
To establish a prima facie case of purposeful racial discrimination in jury
selection, the challenging party may rely solely on the circumstances in his
particular case. This is a departure from the Swain standard which was only
applicable to the most blatant abuses, and is in accordance with the proposition
articulated in Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. that "a
single invidiously discriminatory governmental act" is not "immunized by the
absence of such discrimination in the making of other comparable decisions." 37
In order to establish a prima facie case, the defendant must first show that "he
is a member of a cognizable racial group"." Next he must show "that the
prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire
members of the defendant's race,"3 and that "these facts and any other relevant
circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used [a peremptory challenge]
to exclude the venire persons from the petit jury on account of their race."' 0 The
Court noted that, "The trial court should consider all relevant circumstances"
when deciding whether the defendant has met his burden.'
Once a challenging party establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the
prosecutor to come forward with a "neutral explanation" for striking each juror.
The explanation "need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for
cause" but should not merely be an "assumption or intuition judgment."' The
explanation must give "clear and reasonably specific legitimate reasons""' which
are related to the particular case being tried.
The Court noted its confidence "that trial judges, experienced in supervising voir
dire, will be able to decide if the circumstances concerning the prosecutor's use of
34.
35.
36.
37.
252, 266
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 96-97.
Id. at 97-98.
Id. at 97.
Batson at 95. (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp- 429 US.
(1977)).
Batson, at 96.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 96-97.
Id. at 98.
Id. (quoting Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine. 450 US. 248. 258 (1981)).
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peremptory challenges creates a prima facie case of discrimination against black
4
jurors," and declined "to formulate particular procedures to be followed." 4
Therefore, it is within the trial court's discretion to determine the procedure to
evaluate the explanation as long is it conducts some proceeding. The court "has a
duty to satisfy itself that a prosecutor's challenges were based on constitutionally
permissible trial-related considerations, and that the proffered reasons are genuine
ones, and not merely a pretext for discrimination."'"
IV. LEGAL REASONING
Little required the District of Columbia Court of Appeals to address the issue of
racial discriminatory use of prosecutorial peremptory challenges which the court
referred to as a Batson issue. The court had only one other instance to address this
issue, Nelson v. United States,' and the defendant in the case failed to create an
adequate record for a prima facie case.
The question on appeal was limited to the third factor of the Batson prima facie
burden, which is whether the defendant showed facts and any other relevant
circumstances that raise an inference that the prosecutor purposely excluded jurors
solely because of their race.
To establish a prima facie case the defendant relied on the fact that the
prosecutor exercised six of his seven peremptory challenges on black venire persons
and only two of them had answered a question during voir dire. The questions they
were asked regarded family or friends in law enforcement and nothing in their
responses indicated a bias against the prosecution. The defense argued that it may
in fact indicate a bias toward the prosecution. The only white person struck had
answered a question. The resulting jury was comprised of eight black members,
four white members and two black alternates.
The defendant also pointed to other relevant circumstances to prove-an inference
of racial discrimination. These circumstances included the prosecutor's voluntary
statement explaining his strikes as a whole in a general way by stating that he
looked at "demeanor," "gait" and for people who would give the government a
"fair shake" although, he was not "keeping track." The prosecutor did not give an
explanation for each specific juror. The defense argued that his explanation does

44. Id. at 97-99.
45. Garrett v. Morris. 815 F.2d 509. 511 (8th Cir. 1987).
46. Nelson v. United States. 601 A.2d 582. 590 (D.C. 1990).
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not satisfy Batson's requirement that the prosecutor "articulate a neutral
explanation related to the particular case to be tried"' 7 and the reasons given were
not "clear and reasonably specific."' 8
The government argued that nearly all the prosecutor's peremptory challenges
were against black venire persons because nearly all the persons in the venire were
black. The government pointed out that the prosecutor "passed" on four rounds
and if he had been intent on striking as many black jurors as he could he would
not have "passed." The government also stressed that the trial judge is given broad
discretion in evaluating the circumstances of the voir dire process since he has
"unique awareness of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the voir
dire."4 9 There are circumstances that are not part of the record, including, the
race of the members of the venire (unless discussed in a motion), their facial
expressions and body language, etc. The trial judge has the opportunity to observe
many of these facts which do not appear on the record. Therefore, the trial judge's
conclusion should be given great deference upon review.
The trial court concluded that the defendant failed to make a prima facie
showing of purposeful discrimination in the prosecutor's use of peremptory
challenges. The trial court relied on the facts that one of the seven peremptory
challenges was against a white venire person, that the prosecutor "passed" in four
rounds, and from the judge's own observation he could not infer purposeful
discrimination.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, but expressed concern regarding the trial judge's
statements and reasoning. The court held that the defendant failed to present a
prima facie case because he focused primarily on mere numbers of black venire
persons struck by the prosecutor. Although the court stated that the trial judge's
statements concerning the one white venire person struck and the prosecutor's
general disclaimer being "probably satisfactory" were incorrect as a matter of law,
the court held that this was not reversible error because the judge also relied on his
observations, and the record as a whole did not constitute reversible error.
The court noted that the defendant brought up additional arguments in his
briefs and in oral argument that if presented to the trial court may have
constituted a prima facie case. These arguments included comparing the black
venire persons struck with the white venire person struck, comparing answers to
questions asked, comparing blacks who did not answer to whites who did not
47.

Batson, 476 U.S. at 98.

48.
49.

Texas Dept. of Community Affairs. at 258.
United States v. Moore. 895 F.2d 484. 486 (8th Cir 1990)
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answer, or emphasizing the group being struck as a heterogeneous group of both
sexes and a variety of occupations and social backgrounds.
In closing, the Court of Appeals warned trial judges to make a clear record of
their findings which emphasizes facts or absence of facts they used in making their
decisions. The court noted that it was a close case, but ultimately the defendant,
not the judge, had the burden of showing a prima facie case, which he failed to do
in this case. The court also noted that when close, the trial judge should require
the prosecutor to state his reasons for his challenges, especially since this is not a
heavy burden. Rigorous scrutiny is essential because "the exclusion of even one
black member of the venire for racial reasons violates the equal protection clause
regardless of how many white jurors are struck."50

V.

ANALYSIS

In Little the court warned trial judges to adopt a more precise procedure that
creates a clear record of their reasons for finding or not finding a prima facie
Batson claim. The court emphasized relying on underlying facts or the absence of
facts which support or negate the claim.5 1 The court could only warn trial judges
and could not provide additional procedural guidelines because the defendant
failed to satisfy his prima facie burden.
The peremptory challenge is a very powerful tool for trial lawyers. It gives trial
lawyers the right to challenge venire persons merely on a hunch without having to
furnish an explanation.52 This enables trial lawyers to exclude venire persons from
the jury for reasons which do not rise to the level of exclusion for cause and which
historically were not questioned. Batson, its progeny such as Little, and especially
cases looking to extend the principle even further to include gender,53 could mean
a drastic change and possible demise of the peremptory challenge. A trial lawyer's
discretion in exercising peremptory challenges will no longer be absolute and
unquestioned. The limitations could possibly alleviate some racial and perhaps
gender discrimination from the jury system, however, it could be at the expense of
the trial lawyers powerful tool used to obtain an impartial jury.
As the case law indicates, limitations imposed on the use of peremptory

50. Little, at 885.
51. Id. at 887.
52. Curriden. at 62.
53. J.E.B. v. T.B.. -

U.S.

-

(1994). Case was argued November 2, 1993.
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challenges are based on the jurors' rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the defendants' rights under the Due Process Clause,
specifically his right to an impartial jury. The purpose of the challenge is to
facilitate the objective of obtaining an impartial jury.
However, a peremptory challenge by its very nature is "arbitrary and
capricious." Improper use is likely to go undetected and immune from scrutiny,
which would infringe upon a juror's equal protection right not to be discriminated
against.5 To establish a prima facie case the questionable challenges must be
substantially obvious. Even if challenged, a lawyer may be encouraged against
giving the real reasons for the challenges, because it may be for improper reasons,
or the real reasons may give up the lawyer's trial strategy."
The Batson standard is a way to limit the unquestioned discretion of the trial
lawyer in using peremptory challenges and attempts to alleviate racial exclusion of
jurors. A trial lawyer should have a legitimate reason for excluding a potential
juror, and the lawyer should be able to articulate this reason if the circumstances
indicate an inference of racial discrimination. This does not mean that every
challenge must be scrutinized, and in reality only those challenges which are the
most obvious will get scrutinized.
The Court of Appeals in Little was justified in issuing its warning to trial judges
to specifically state on the record the facts and circumstances for their decision on
a Batson issue. It is unconstitutional to exclude someone from serving on a jury
because of their race or gender, therefore, strict procedures for enforcing Batson
need to be followed to attempt to diminish this injustice, but must also be balanced
against the need to obtain an impartial jury. Claims deriving from an insubstantial
inference of improper discrimination should not be scrutinized.

VI.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court in Batson limited the use of peremptory challenges to
prohibit the exclusion of a juror on the basis of race. The Supreme Court has
recently extended Batson to protect a white defendant, Powers v. OhioP0 to apply
in civil cases as well as criminal cases, Edmonson v. Leesville;5" and to be binding
54. Note Due Process Limits on Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenges. 102
(1989).
55. Curriden. supra note 15, at 62.
56. Powers v. Ohio. 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
57. Edmonson v. Leesville. 500 U.S. 614 (1991).

HARv

L REV. 1014
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on the criminal defense counsel as it is on the prosecutor, Georgia v. McCollum."
The Court is currently considering extending Batson to include gender, J.E.B. v.
T.B.." The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, in December 1993, extended
Batson to prohibit striking white jurors based on their race. The courts continue to
define what constitutes a Batson violation and need to also focus on devising
procedures to detect and eliminate these growing violations.0 0
As the court in Little cautioned trial judges, a clear record stating the relied
upon facts and the reasons for a Batson claim must be enforced. The voir dire
process needs to be carefully monitored to ensure a fair trial. Rigorous scrutiny is
essential for any potential Batson claim. Strict procedures on detecting potential
Batson claims and the growing categories of violations may lead to inquiry into
every peremptory challenge, and thus bring the challenge closer to a challenge for
cause. If every peremptory challenge is questioned it is no longer a tool which the
lawyer can use to choose one juror over another for no articulated reason. This
could be the death of the peremptory challenge, or at least an end to the challenge
as we know it.
Trial lawyers have an opportunity to observe a potential juror's demeanor, facial
expressions, body language and other such characteristics which may lead them to
conclude that certain jurors may be unable to be impartial. These reasons may be
insufficient to sustain a challenge for cause but, a trial lawyer may be able to
exclude these jurors by way of the peremptory challenge. Limitations on the
challenge need to be imposed to combat the evils of improper discrimination, but
we must be careful not to eliminate the essential tool, the peremptory challenge,
which is necessary to obtain an impartial jury. Only those challenges based on a
substantial inference of improper discrimination should be scrutinized.

58. Georgia v. McCollum. 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
59. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.. 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
60. In September 1990. the Joint Committee on Judicial Administration in the District of Columbia

Courts established a Task Force on Racial and Ethnic Bias and a Task Force on Gender Bias in the Courts.
The purpose of the Task Forces was to determine the extent to which racial, ethnic, and gender biases were
perceived or found in the District of Columbia courts. The purpose was also to make recommendations to
reduce or eliminate biases. The Task Forces issued their final report in May 1992.
The Task Forces examined court employment practices, treatment of participants during litigation,
attorney disciplinary proceedings, the composite of the judiciary, etc. However, they did not specifically
examine perceived bias or actual discrimination in jury selection.
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Addendum
On April 19, 1994, the Supreme Court in J.E.B. v, Alabama ex rel. T.B.01 held

that under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, "gender,
like race, is an unconstitutional proxy for juror competence and impartiality" and
02
thus "gender-based" peremptory strikes are prohibited.
This creates a further obstacle to the use of the peremptory challenge. Justice
O'Connor points out in her concurring opinion that this decision is costly by
making "the peremptory challenge less discretionary and more like a challenge for
cause" it will "force lawyers to articulate what we know is often inarticulable,"
and will increase "the number of cases in which jury selection-once a sideshow-will
become part of the main event." 6
Justice Scalia states in his dissent that "the Court imperils a practice that has
been considered an essential part of fair jury trial since the dawn of the common
law. The Constitution of the United States neither requires nor permits this
vandalizing of our people's traditions."6 As mentioned, this could be the death of
the peremptory challenge as we know it.

61.

J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.. 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).

62. Split decision: Justice Blackmun wrote the majority opinion, in ,hich Justices Stevens O'Connor.
Souter. and Ginsburg joined. Justices O'Connor and Kennedy filed concurring opinions. Justice Rehnquist
filed a dissenting opinion and Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opinion, in which Judges Rchnquist and Thomas
joined.
63. Id. at 15-16.
64. Id. at 24.

